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INTRODUCTION
There are no billboards-and virtually no outdoor advertising-in
Hawaii.' Why not? Imagine this. You and your significant other have
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1. HAW. REV. STAT. § 264-71(3) (1985) defines "outdoor advertising" as "any device
which is":
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worked hard for two years to save enough money to take a two-week
vacation on Maui. This is your first trip to the Hawaiian islands. After the
long flight, you are quite tired. You arrive at night and are whisked by cab
to your rented condo on a small rise across the street from a gorgeous bay.
Gazing east from your condo, you should have a stellar view of breath-
taking Hawaiian sunrises. The pictures in the brochure showing the view
were incredible. Your level of anticipation is high. Arising before dawn the
next morning, the two of you step onto your lanai only to discover that a
large billboard hawking scuba-diving lessons or offshore coral reef
excursions almost totally obscures your view.
You are furious and want to move to another spot on the island. You
discover, though, that billboards obscure the view of almost all the living
accommodations across the street from the beaches. Living accommodations
(A) A writing, picture, painting, light, model, display, emblem, sign, billboard, or
similar device situated outdoors, which is so designed that it draws the attention
of persons on any federal-aid or state highway, to any property, services,
entertainment, or amusement, bought, sold, rented, hired, offered, or otherwise
traded in by any person, or to the place or person where or by whom such buying,
selling, renting, hiring, offering or other trading is carried on;
(B) A sign, billboard, poster, notice, bill, or word or words in writing situated
outdoors and so designed that it draws the attention of and is read by persons on
any federal-aid or state highway; or
(C) A sign, billboard, writing, symbol or emblem made of lights, or a device or
design made of lights so designed that its primary function is not giving light,
which is situated outdoors and draws the attention of persons on any federal-aid
or state highway.
In the succeeding section, the law controls outdoor advertising by stating that:
No person shall erect or maintain any outdoor advertising outside of the right of
way boundary and visible from the main-traveled way of any federal-aid or state
highway within the State, except the following:
(1) Directional or other official signs and notices, which signs and
notices shall include, but not be limited to, signs and notices pertaining
to natural wonders, scenic and historic attractions as authorized or
required by law.
(2) Signs, displays, and devices advertising the sale or lease of the
property upon which they are located.
(3) Signs, displays, and devices advertising activities conducted on the
property upon which they are located.
(4) Signs lawfully in existence on October 22, 1965, determined by the
[D]irector [of the Hawaii Department of Transportation] to be landmark
signs, including signs on farm structures or natural surfaces of historic
or artistic significance the preservation of which would be consistent
with the purpose of this section.
§ 264-72. In other statutory sections, the Hawaii legislature provided for a grace period for
such advertising lawfully in existence at the time of passage, for the removal of
nonconforming advertising at the appropriate time, and for compensation. §§ 264-72, -74, -
75. In addition to the civil remedies, the Act made such advertising a public nuisance and
prescribed the penalty for its violation as a $25 to $500 fine and/or a month in jail. § 264-
77.
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not separated from the view by streets are prohibitively expensive, but you
took the bait and now you will switch. While you may have salvaged this
trip, Hawaii's tourist bureau should not expect a return visit. No one, of
course, is more acutely aware of this potential tourism nightmare than the
members of the Hawaii legislature, who long ago banned almost all outdoor
advertising.2
Enjoying your view and believing your problems are now over, you
look forward to seeing another of Maui's most impressive sights, sunrise
over the clouds from atop Haleakala, a 12,000-foot inactive volcano.
Tourists gather every morning of the year on the 10,000-foot summit to
marvel at the majesty of the sun as it escapes the night. You have brought
your best camera, intending to snap the shutter once every thirty seconds.
The brochures, and friends who preceded you, claim this spot makes for a
marvelous set of pictures. The first shots seem great, but just as the sun has
made its way almost out of the clouds, another image creeps into your lens
just to the left of the sun. This cannot be, you think, but sure enough, there
it is-a "billboard" coming to you from outer space, this one containing a
soft drink logo. As the sun gets higher, you see another. Tennis shoes.
Beer. An information superhighway service. Cigarettes. Automobiles.
Laxatives. What can the Hawaii legislature do about space billboards?3
2. The law was passed in 1966. See Kirk Caldwell, Note, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of
San Diego: The Conflict Between Aesthetic Zoning and Commercial Speech Protection;
Hawaii's Billboard Law under Fire, 5 U. HAW. L. REv. 79 (1983). See infra notes 45-120
and accompanying text for a discussion of the First Amendment implications of
governmentally imposed limits on commercial expression.
3. Or advertising-laden blimps perpetually flying high over Maui? As an island with
a laid-back, carefree reputation, perhaps it should not be surprising that Maui is the home
of a satirical publication entitled Maui's Going Bananas. And given the seriousness with
which any kind of billboard advertising is viewed in Hawaii (there is a move afoot in Kihei,
Maui, to use Hawaii's billboard law to ban the small signs that adorn the inside of the fence
of the little league baseball field there), perhaps it should come as no surprise that the lead
article on page one in the May 13, 1994, edition of Maui's Going Bananas concerns
(tongue-in-cheek, remember) a local businessman who has purchased a "big, gigantic,
colossal blimp" with "6.4 million candlepower lights which will be visible from all the
islands at night." Keoni Wiliki, Maui to be Home of Big Gigantic Colossal Blimp, MAUI'S
GOING BANANAs, May 13, 1994, at 1. The "owner" of the blimp was quoted as saying:
"Just imagine, banners, lights, signs, and all of it flying so high it'll be outside the
jurisdiction of the County [the island of Maui is a county]!" Id. As an illustration of his
disdain for "regulators," the businessman said: "[W]e can still look at rainbows in awe, and
Maui's certainly got more of them than anywhere else on Earth, but only because our local
lawmakers haven't figured out a way to regulate them." Id.
For an interesting historical and regulatory review of outdoor advertising predating the
development of the Supreme Court's commercial speech doctrine, see OuTDOOR
ADvERTIsING: HISTORY AND REGULATION (John W. Houck ed., 1969).
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[S]ome.commercial firms have suggested the possibility of advertising
goods and services from outer space. Miles long, constructed of mylar,
and given form through a latticework of inflatable tubing, these
immense billboards would orbit the Earth at relatively low altitudes.
The ads would appear from the Earth's surface to be as large as a full
moon. Although unsuitable for complex messages, proponents of the
concept envision the possibility that corporate trademarks would be
clearly visible.4
This Article explores the extent to which legislative action to regulate
advertising from space could withstand constitutional scrutiny. Part I traces
the commercial speech framework as it has been developed and applied by
the Supreme Court. Part II considers an application of this analysis to
advertising in space. Considering that regulation of space as a medium of
communication might affect noncommercial as well as commercial speech,
Part IH analyzes the possible impact of such regulation on noncommercial
speech. Finally, the Coauthors offer different conclusions about the
propriety of regulation of space advertising.
A. The Technological Capability
Space billboards could take one of two forms: 1) a single-entity
billboard spacecraft, programmed, powered, and launched to achieve and
maintain a particular orbit and orientation;5 or 2) the payload of a separate
spacecraft, which would, as orbiting space shuttles so often have done in
the case of communication satellites,6 deposit the payload into space and
then fire rockets in the payload to achieve and maintain a particular orbit
and orientation.7 All the technologies for achieving advertising from outer
space exist--and not just in the United States. Launch capability exists
through the European Space Agency and through the Russian and Chinese
governments, and it is cheaper there than in the United States.
4. Lawrence Roberts, Proposed Bill to Ban Space Advertising, 88 A.B.A. SEC. L. &
POL'Y COMM. BULL. OF L., Sci. & TECH. 4 (1994). Mr. Roberts is chair of the U.S.
Aerospace Law & Policy Committee of the Aerospace Law Division of the A.B.A. Section.
While the introduction to this Article uses "aesthetics" to illustrate one perceived
problem with space billboards, aesthetic considerations could pale in comparison to the
effects some words on space billboards might have, a problem addressed infra notes 155-61
and accompanying text, in commenting on the unique magnitude of this new medium of
expression.
5. Id.
6. JOHN R. BITTNER, BROADCASTING AND TELECOMMUNICATION 121 (3d ed. 1991).
7. Roberts, supra note 4, at 4.
8. Id.
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B. Space Marketing Concepts, Inc.
In April 1993, Michael Lawson, chief executive officer of Space
Marketing Concepts, Inc., a privately held company in Roswell, Georgia,
proposed to launch an "environmental billboard."9 Apparently, Lawson's
idea was for half the billboard to contain scientific instruments, e.g., ozone
measuring devices, with the other half containing a sponsor's logo.10
Depending on the source of information, space billboards would range from
about half the size of the moon to the full size of the moon; would be
visible all the time or only during daylight hours (mainly adjacent to
sunrise and sunset); could last from two weeks to one year to forever;
would be less than one-tenth as bright to 2,000 times brighter than the full
moon; would range from one kilometer to one mile long, from 400 meters
to three quarters of a mile wide and circle the planet in an orbit 140
nautical miles to 300 kilometers high." Apparently, they would operate
in a low-Earth and sun-synchronous orbit with corporate sponsors having
the final say as to their "exact" locations. 2
The total cost of such space billboards would be $15 to $30
million. 3 Lawson said he hoped "the marriage of marketing and environ-
mentalism would appeal to companies with global identities, the kind that
already have multimiUion-dollar advertising budgets." 4 By November
1993, Space Marketing had "received more than a dozen inquiries from
prospective clients ." 5 One of Lawson's original ideas "was to loft the
five-ring symbol of the Olympic games."'6 An April 12, 1993, news
release issued by Space Marketing quoted Lawson as saying:
A tremendous opportunity [exists] for a global-oriented company to
-have [its] logo and message seen by billions of people on a history
making, high profile vehicle. Imagine attending the [1996 Summer
9. Orbiting-BillboardProposal Gets Astronomers'Attention, SKY & TELESCOPE, Nov.
1993, at 10, 10 [hereinafter Orbiting-Billboard].
10. Id. It appears that Mr. Lawson may have taken a cue from Valentine v. Chrestensen,
316 U.S. 52 (1942), where an entrepreneur, prohibited by the sanitation code from
distributing purely commercial handbills on New York City's streets, put a political message
on the other side of the handbills to take advantage of an exception to the ordinance
allowing distribution of handbills containing political messages.
11. See Joseph B. Allen, New Heights (?) For Advertising, ASTRONOMY, Sept. 1993,
at 13; Gary Stix, Advertising Space, Sm. AM., Apr. 1993, at 114; Commercial Space: Your
Ad in this Orbit, POPULAR MEcHANIcs, Aug. 1993, at 13; Orbiting-Billboard, supra note
9, at 10.
12. Allen, supra note 11, at 15.
13. Orbiting-Billboard, supra note 9, at 10.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.; see also Stix, supra note 11, at 114.
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Olympics] in Atlanta and in the sky floats the logo and message of
your favorite soft drink, not on a blimp, not towed by an airplane, but
actually orbiting in space, miles above Earth, and visible throughout
the world with the naked eye. 7
Somewhere along the way, the marketing director for the city of
Atlanta suggested to then-Atlanta Mayor Maynard Jackson that the city sell
advertising on Lawson's billboard in connection with Atlanta's hosting of
the 1996 Olympics. 8 Jackson, however, called space billboards "environ-
mental pollution," adding that he did not want to see a billboard marring
the sky. 9 Jackson was not the only one who felt that way.
A Washington advocacy group, the Center for the Study of Commer-
cialism, created a coalition of scientific, consumer, and environmental
organizations to fight the space billboard. Cornell University astrono-
mer Carl Sagan labeled it "an abomination." Statements opposing the
idea were released by the American Astronomical Society and the
executive committee of the International Astronomical Union.20
Robert Park, speaking for the American Physical Society, "called the
orbiting billboard [idea] horrifying and absurd. 'It's pollution to the Nth
degree."''2 Astronomers were among the first to object, but Lawson said
they had nothing to worry about because the billboard would be visible
only during daylight hours so that "[n]o astronomer would have the night
sky obstructed by the Space Marketing Concepts orbital platform." The
Commercialism group doubted that the principal thrust of the billboard was
to be scientific research, especially considering that the Space Marketing
news release told would-be clients that the space billboard could "reach a
potential audience three-to-five times greater than the television audience
for the Super Bowl.
23
Members of Congress also reacted by introducing legislation to ban
the fledgling industry.24 Lawson said his company "knew ahead of time
there'd be reaction to doing something this blatant." Within a few
months, Space Marketing Concepts had backed off the orbiting satellite
17. Allen, supra note 11, at 13, 15 (second alteration in original).
18. Id. at 15.
19. Id.
20. Orbiting-Billboard, supra note 9, at 10.
21. Allen, supra note 11, at 15.
22. Id. at 13.
23. Id.
24. Orbiting-Billboard, supra note 9, at 10. Basically, the companion bills, H.R. 2599,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) and S. 1145, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), would impose a
complete ban on advertising from outer space. Neither bill has been re-introduced in the
104th Congress. As of March 1995, neither house of Congress had taken significant action
on either bill.
25. Orbiting-Billboard, supra note 9, at 10.
[Vol. 47
ADVERTISING FROM OUTER SPACE
plan,26 at least for the time being, but is still in the space advertising
business, selling space on commercial rockets.2
[During the summer of 1993], millions of Americans saw a
Conestoga rocket sitting on its launch pad waiting to blast off into
space with its precious cargo, the Commercial Experiment Transporter
(COMET). They also saw four words emblazoned on the side of the
rocket: Schwarzenegger and Last Action Hero. The rocket carrying the
first private commercial space mission also carried the first advertise-
ment... [sent into] space [by American technology], making local
space safe for sales pitches and sparking a vigorous debate over
whether advertisements belong in space at all.
[However,]... the LastAction Hero ad wasn't the first advertise-
ment [ever] in space: In an effort to raise foreign currency, for the past
four years the Russians have sold space on their Soyuz rockets to hawk
merchandise ranging from Sony electronics to Unicharm feminine
hygiene products.28
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) does not
quite know what to think. NASA spokesperson Charles Redmond said,
"One of our goals was to encourage space commercialization, [but] [w]e
had not anticipated it in this area." 9 John Logsdon, director of the Space
Policy Institute at George Washington University, said it was a bit like
advertisements placed just under the ice at hockey games-aesthetically
displeasing-but he warned that because of the economics of the private-
sector space industry, it may not be avoidable.3 ° With respect to orbiting
billboards, John Pike, director of space policy at the Federation of
American Scientists, said he hoped he never looked into the sky to see the
equivalent of the Goodyear Blimp in orbit.3 "I think space is about the
proposition that [humankind] does not live by bread alone-that there are
values in life other than commercial values."32
Since the interpretation of the First Amendment ultimately will
determine whether American launch vehicles place advertising into outer
space, it is important to note that an analogous activity, newsgathering from
outer space by remote sensing,33 likely enjoys only secondary First
26. Id.
27. See Devera Pine, Selling America on Orbiting Ads, OMNI, Feb. 1994, at 27, 27.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Don Sneed & Kyu Ho Youm, First Amendment Rights in Space: An
"Emerging" Constitutional Issue, COMM. & L., Dec. 1989, at 45, 45-50.
Number 3]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA W JOURNAL
Amendment protection.34 Assuming, arguendo, that the First Amendment
will not allow a complete ban on advertising from outer space, are there
any other legal theories that could render space billboards actionable by
private parties?
The initial public response to the idea of space advertising makes
clear that some groups and individuals will raise a hue and cry. Absent
congressional action banning the practice, private persons might bring
actions based on such long-standing legal theories as nuisance,35 inter-
ference with real property airspace rights,36 inverse condemnation,37
visual environmental pollution,38 and privacy invasion.39
Regardless of how the United States deals with advertising from outer
space, the American response will not likely resolve the question. Space
billboards launched from other nations would be "visible throughout the
world with the naked eye,"4 including the United States. America has
34. See Rita A. Reimer, Newsgathering from Space: Land Remote-Sensing and the
First Amendment, 40 FED. COMM. L.J. 321 (1988).
35.
The general rule that no one has absolute freedom in the use of his property,
but is restrained by the co-existence of equal rights in his neighbor to the use of
his property, so that each, in exercising his right, must do no act which causes
injury to his neighbor, is so well understood, is so universally recognized, and
stands so impregnably in the necessities of the social state, that its vindication by
argument would be superfluous.... The [functional] meaning of the rule is that
one may not use his own property to the injury of any legal right of another.
Booth v. Rome, W. & 0. T. R.R., 35 N.E. 592, 594 (N.Y. 1893).
36. The Model Airspace Act was promulgated in the early 1970s by a committee of the
Section of Real Property, Probate, and Trust Law of the ABA. It defines airspace as: "[R]eal
property, and until title thereto or rights, interests or estates therein are separately
transferred, airspace is the property of the person or persons holding title to the land surface
beneath it." MODEL AIRSPACE ACT § 3 (Final Draft 1972). The Act also defines airspace
"as that space which extends from the surface of the earth upward" and "which lies within
the vertical upward extension of [the] surface boundaries." Id. § 2.
37. This legal theory has been used by owners of agricultural land being partially
subdivided for residential building purposes who suddenly discover that the property's
airspace has become the final approach to an airport. See, e.g., Roark v. City of Caldwell,
394 P.2d 641 (Idaho 1964); see also Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Road Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487
(1965); Martin v. Port of Seattle, 391 P.2d 540 (Wash. 1964).
38. Terrestrial billboard ordinances and case law are grounded mostly on aesthetic
considerations, but the distinction between aesthetics and visual environmental pollution
may be only semantic. The pollution argument might carry more weight because aesthetics-
based decisions are criticized for involving far too much subjectivity (i.e., beauty is in the
eye of the beholder). The most direct analogies to visual environmental pollution are noise
and sound pollution. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
39. Do private citizens have the right to be left alone by advertising? One can turn off
the radio or the television set, one can close the newspaper or the magazine, but can one
avoid space billboards? Is it enough to say that someone who objects to space billboards
should simply never gaze at the sky?
40. Allen, supra note 11, at 15.
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always favored the "free flow" of ideas across national frontiers.41 As a
result, America has felt free not only to transmit information without regard
to the sovereign boundaries of others, but to actually aim specific
information inside such borders as well.42 Many countries have indicated
their distaste for this policy: some western nations in terms of the effect of
America's entertainment programming on their culture,43 and all the
former Soviet-bloc states in terms of America's persistence in transmitting
news and other information inside their borders." In the technologically
brave new world, trans-border expression will be quite difficult to control,
even where a nation desires to respect the sovereign borders of others. In
the context of space billboards, America, ironically, could soon find itself
on the receiving end of "unwanted" trans-border data flow for the first
time.
I. THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH FRAMEWORK45
The Supreme Court initially refused to extend any First Amendment
protection to commercial speech. In Valentine v. Chrestensen," the Court,
in what Justice Douglas would later call a "casual, almost offhand" ruling
that "has not survived reflection,"47 concluded that "purely commercial"
advertising on public thoroughfares (and presumably anywhere else)
merited no First Amendment protection.4' Reexamination of this approach
to commercial speech did not begin until the 1970s.
41. See DONALD R. BROWNE, INTERNATIONAL RADIO BROADCASTING: THE LIMITs OF
THE LmITL=SS MEDIUM 25 (1982).
42. Id.
43. See LoY A. SINGLETON, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE INFORMATION AGE 88-89,
98 (1986).
44. BROWNE, supra note 41, at 23-24.
45. Even though the Supreme Court has developed a comprehensive scheme for
evaluating regulations on commercial speech, that framework enjoys substantial
commonality with the approach that the Court takes to noncommercial speech. For example,
the time, place, and manner analysis applied in noncommercial speech cases incorporates
the same concept of balancing First Amendment interests against asserted governmental
interests that the Court uses in the commercial speech cases. San Francisco Arts & Athletics
v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 537 n.16 (1987). The Court recently
recognized the "difficulty of drawing bright lines that will clearly cabin commercial speech
in a distinct category." City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1511
(1993). The hallmark of First Amendment jurisprudence, applied to both commercial and
noncommercial expression, is that regulations do not discriminate on the basis of speech
content. See David F. Sherwood, In Defense of the Golden Arches: Constitutionality of
Municipal Regulation of Commercial Architecture, 60 CONN. B.J. 271, 290-91 (1986).
46. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
47. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
48. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. at 54.
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Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations
marked the beginning of the process.49 The case involved a city ordinance
that prevented newspapers from carrying help-wanted advertising in sex-
designated columns "except where the employer or advertiser is free to
make hiring or employment referral decisions on the basis of sex."5
Under the ordinance, employers could discriminate on the basis of sex only
upon showing a bona fide occupational basis for treating males and females
differently. The city, therefore, ordered a newspaper to stop running sex-
designated help-wanted advertising.5
The Supreme Court rejected the newspaper's First Amendment
attack. 2 More significantly, however, it also rejected the city's argument
that it could enforce its regulation because the speech was commercial and,
therefore, constitutionally unprotected.53 Recognizing that "speech is not
rendered commercial by the mere fact that it relates to an advertisement,"
the Court decided Pittsburgh Press not on the basis of the speech at issue
being "commercial," but instead on the illegality-impermissible sex-based
hiring-of the subject matter that the speech concerned.54 Governmental
interests in combating illegal activity, therefore, outweighed any First
Amendment interest that the newspaper could assert.55
As it examined the nature of the transaction that the speech concerned,
the Supreme Court thus began establishing a test for deciding when
commercial speech would receive protection and when it would not. The
label "advertising" on "commercial" speech no longer automatically
prevented a communication from receiving constitutional protection. The
49. Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. 376 (1973). One commentator has suggested that
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), represented the "first real step toward the
deregulation of commercial speech and the acknowledgement by the Court of real
constitutional protection for commercial speech." B. Mack, Commercial Speech: A
Historical Overview of its First Amendment Protections and an Analysis of its Future
Constitutional Safeguards, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 59, 61 (1988). This observation notwithstand-
ing, the Bigelow Court itself recognized Pittsburgh Press's significance. See infra note 56.
50. Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 378.
51. Id. at 380.
52. Id. at 391.
53. Id. at 384.
54. The newspaper, the Court observed, "would have us abrogate the distinction
between commercial and other speech." Id. at 388. The Court declined because "[w]hatever
the merits of this contention may be in other contexts, it is unpersuasive in this case.
Discrimination in employment is not only commercial activity, it is illegal commercial
activity under the ordinance." Id. (emphasis in original).
55. Id. at 389. ("Any First Amendment interest which might be served by advertising
an ordinary commercial proposal and which might arguably outweigh the governmental
interest supporting the regulation is altogether absent when the commercial activity itself
is illegal .... ")
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Court instead began its inquiry by looking at the purpose of the speech. By
considering the legality of the activity that the speech concerned, Pittsburgh
Press set the Court's direction toward the first prong of the test that it
would eventually establish for determining commercial speech protec-
tion. 6
Bigelow v. Virginia represented the Court's next major step toward
giving commercial speech clearly defined First Amendment protection and
toward the establishment of a framework for applying that protection. 7
Bigelow involved newspaper ads that ran in Virginia for abortion services
in New York.58 At the time abortion was illegal in Virginia, and, in fact,
the state had a statute making criminal the publication of ads about abortion
services.59 The Supreme Court invalidated the statute and, in so doing, put
in place another piece of what would become the commercial speech
frameworkP
°
Aside from clearly affirming that placement of the communication in
an advertisement did not bar First Amendment protection, Bigelow also
recognized a consumer information rationale for protecting commercial
speech.6' Since it was not illegal for Virginia residents to go to New York
for abortion services, the ad implicated First Amendment rights of readers
to receive important information of public interest. 2 In such cases, the
speaker's "First Amendment interests coincided with the constitutional
interests of the general public."
63
Most importantly, Bigelow balanced the First Amendment interests of
the speaker and audience against Virginia's asserted governmental interests
56. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), recognized the significance of Pittsburgh
Press. In Bigelow, Justice Blackmun's majority opinion observed that Pittsburgh Press made
clear that commercial advertising enjoys a degree of First Amendment protection since the
advertisements at issue "would have received some degree of First Amendment protection
if the commercial proposal had been legal." Id. at 821.
57. Id. at 809.
58. Id. at 811-12.
59. Id. at 812-13.
60. Id. at 829.
61. Id. at 818. Chrestensen, the Bigelow Court said, did not mean that "all statutes
regulating commercial advertising are immune from constitutional challenge." Id. at 819-20.
Pittsburgh Press and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), provided
support for the proposition that advertising had already been given a measure of First
Amendment protection. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 821.
62. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 822. Noting that the ad "did more than simply propose a
commercial transaction," the Court held that the portion of the ads communicating the fact
that getting an abortion in New York did not require residence there meant that the ad
"involve[d] the exercise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating
opinion." Id.
63. Id.
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in promulgating the regulation.' Virginia justified the ad ban as part of
its process of regulating the quality of medical care in the state.65 The ad
in question, however, was not related to state regulation of medical care
since Virginia certainly could not regulate medical services in New York,
where the advertised services were actually rendered.66 The Court
concluded that Virginia really was seeking to regulate what its residents
could hear or read about abortion services.67 Allowing a regulation to
stand on such a premise, the Court reasoned, would permit states to
regulate a potentially infinite number of national publications on similar
grounds.68 Bigelow explicitly ratified what the Court had done in Pitts-
burgh Press by balancing the asserted governmental interests in regulating
the speech with the First Amendment interests of speaker and audience.69
The Court found Virginia's claimed governmental interests not substantial
enough to override First Amendment rights to express and receive
speech.7°
With its decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,7" the Court definitively stated that
commercial speech encompasses significant First Amendment interests, and
requires careful judicial scrutiny of the regulations' actual effects. In
Virginia Pharmacy, the Court invalidated a state law prohibiting the
advertising of prescription drug prices.72 The Court again focused on
consumer interests in the free flow of information, something it found of
greater interest to many individuals than political debate.73 Also, it
64. Id. at 826. Regardless, the Court said, of how a state labeled the speech, "a court
may not escape the task of assessing the First Amendment interest at stake and weighing
it against the public interest allegedly served by the regulation." Id. at 822.
65. Id. at 827.
66. Id. at 824.
67. Id. at 827.
68. Id. at 828-29. Presumably, for example, a state could bar magazines from carrying
gun ads if the state's gun laws imposed certain kinds of restrictions on gun sales. Taken to
its logical conclusion, the rationale that Virginia offered would also have permitted dry
counties in individual states to ban liquor and beer ads in locally circulated national
magazines.
69. Id. at 826-29.
70. Id. at 829. Justice Rehnquist joined by Justice White dissented in Bigelow, finding
that the Court should have vindicated Virginia's legitimate interest in "preventing
commercial exploitation of the health needs of its citizens." Id. at 836 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
71. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
72. Id. at 773. The law subjected pharmacists to discipline if they "publish[ed],
advertise[d], or promote[d] directly or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, any amount,
price, fee, premium, discount, rebate or credit terms ... for any drugs which may be
dispensed only by prescription." Id. at 750.
73. Id. at 763.
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balanced the First Amendment interests in transmission and receipt of
consumer information against the government's asserted regulatory
interests.74 The Court looked more closely at how well the regulation
achieved the asserted governmental interests.
Virginia claimed that its interest in prohibiting advertising of
prescription drug prices was a need to promote high professional standards
among pharmacists.7' While acknowledging the obvious merit in such a
governmental interest, the Court emphasized that Virginia had other means
of achieving that objective.76 The case concerned the pharmacists' retail
sales and not really their professional standards. "[A]ny pharmacist guilty
of professional dereliction that actually endangers his customer will
promptly lose his license."77 Virginia Pharmacy stressed that the asserted
state interests amounted to "protectiveness" of citizens resting "in large
measure on the advantages of their being kept in ignorance," something that
did not "directly affect professional standards one way or the other. 78
Having recognized the consumer interests in the free flow of commercial
information, and having required a balancing of First Amendment and
governmental interests, the Court had nearly formulated its framework for
evaluating commercial speech.79
The Court tied together its structure for evaluating the regulation of
commercial speech in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission."0 The case required that the Court squarely face the
74. Id. at 761-70. The Court concluded that "the justifications Virginia has offered for
suppressing the flow of prescription drug price information, far from persuading us that the
flow is not protected by the First Amendment, have reinforced our view that it is." Id. at
770.
75. Id. at 766.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 768-69.
78. Id. at 769.
79. Virginia Pharmacy recognized another important element in the evaluation of
burdens imposed on commercial speech. Virginia had not claimed that it could bar
prescription drug price advertisements because "they are false or misleading in any way."
Id. at 771 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) and Konigsberg
v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49, 51 n.10 (1961). The Court noted that "[u]ntruthful speech,
commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake." Id. at 771. The
opinion went on to note that much commercial speech, though not provably false, is
"deceptive or misleading" and that the First Amendment permits regulation of such speech.
Id. at 771-72.
80. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). Between Bigelow and Central Hudson, the
Court decided four other significant commercial speech cases: Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S.
1 (1979); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678 (1977); and Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
None of them alone added conceptually to the developing commercial speech framework.
Together they made clear the Court's commitment to protection for commercial speech.
Number 3]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
question of whether a state could simply bar a kind of commercial
expression as part of an overall regulatory scheme. Following the fuel
shortage of the early 1970s, the New York Public Service Commission
promulgated regulations prohibiting electric utilities from running ads
promoting the use of electricity." When the fuel shortage eased, Central
Hudson Gas & Electric sought to run such promotional ads. The New York
Public Service Commission's efforts to stop them brought the issue to the
Supreme Court.
The Court used the case to set out a four-part test for deciding the
validity of restrictions on commercial speech. The Court carefully noted
that it had already decided that commercial speech falls within the First
Amendment's ambit, though such speech does not receive the same
measure of protection as noncommercial speech.82 The Court synthesized
Linmark relied on Bigelow and Virginia Pharmacy in emphasizing a First Amendment
interest in consumer information displayed on real estate "For Sale" signs. Linmark, 431
U.S. at 91-92. That interest, the Court held, outweighed a town's interest in banning such
signs as a way of discouraging "white flight' from neighborhoods, particularly since the
record did not "confirm the township's assumption that proscribing such signs will reduce
public awareness of realty sales and thereby decrease public concern over selling." Id. at
95-96.
Carey overturned a New York statute that made advertising contraceptives a crime.
Justice Brennan's majority opinion again relied on Bigelow and Virginia Pharmacy and, by
analogy, to Pittsburgh Press, for the proposition that since New York's law did not regulate
an unlawful product, the state could regulate speech about the product only if it could show
some other compelling governmental interest. Carey, 431 U.S. at 700-01. The Court easily
dismissed the interest that New York offered-that ads for contraceptive products would
offend and embarrass those exposed to them. Id. at 701. Relying on Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15 (1971) (a case involving a young man who wore into a courthouse a jacket
adorned with the words "Fuck the Draft"), the Carey majority reiterated the Court's long-
standing position that, absent obscenity, offensiveness of speech does not justify its
suppression. Carey, 431 U.S. at 701.
Bates relied largely on the Bigelow/irginia Pharmacy emphasis on consumer
information as a protectible First Amendment interest, and prohibited a total ban on attorney
advertising. Bates, 433 U.S. at 363-65. Two other attorney advertising cases, Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978), and In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978), bear
mentioning. Both applied the Bigelow/Virginia Pharmacy principles to in-person attorney
solicitation (an issue that Bates did not address).
Friedman sustained Texas's prohibition on the use of trade names by optometrists.
Friedman, 440 U.S. at 19. Trade names, the Court concluded, constituted "a form of
commercial speech that has no intrinsic meaning." Id. at 12. The Court, therefore, could not
find the same consumer information interests it recognized in Bigelow, Virginia Pharmacy,
and Bates. As important to the outcome, the Court found "a significant possibility" that
trade names used by professionals could mislead the public because they free professionals
from dependence on personal reputation, and allow assumption of "a new trade name if
negligence or misconduct casts a shadow over the old one." Id. at 13.
81. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 558-59.
82. Id. at 562-63.
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its commercial speech jurisprudence in holding that, assuming the speech
does not mislead or concern unlawful activity, the protection available to
commercial speech depends on the nature of the expression, the govern-
mental interests asserted in support of the regulation, and the effectiveness
of the regulation in advancing the governmental interest asserted.13
This analysis produced the four-part test that, with some refinement,
the Court now uses to analyze commercial speech cases." The Central
Hudson test asks: (1) whether the speech concerns lawful activity and is not
misleading; (2) whether the asserted governmental interest in regulating the
speech is substantial; (3) whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted; and (4) whether the regulation is more
extensive than necessary to serve the asserted governmental interests.85
Nine years after Central Hudson, the Supreme Court modified the
fourth prong of the Central Hudson test by requiring only a "fit" between
the legislature's ends and the means used to accomplish them.86 Justice
Scalia's opinion rejected the notion that the "no more extensive than
reasonably necessary" element required the government to employ the
"least-restrictive-means standard" to regulate commercial speech." While
the Fox modification of the Central Hudson test represents a standard more
deferential to legislative mandates, it still requires balancing of the means
used to achieve the asserted governmental interest against the important
free expression interests at stake.88
83. Id. at 564.
84. See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 475-80 (1989); see infra notes 89-120
and accompanying text.
85. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. The Court in Central Hudson concluded that New
York's total utility advertising ban did not pass the test because "[t]he commission has not
demonstrated that its interest in conservation cannot be protected adequately by more limited
regulation of appellant's commercial expression." Id. at 570. While the regulation concerned
speech that was not misleading, the government could demonstrate a substantial
interest-energy conservation-that would justify regulations. Id. at 568. New York also had
chosen a regulation that had "a direct link" with the governmental interest asserted. Id. at
569. The Court found, however, that a regulation less than a total ban could also have
advanced the state's conservation interests since ads providing information about the relative
efficiency and expense of utility service could also promote energy conservation. Id. at 570-
71.
86. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480.
87. Id. at 477.
88. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1510
(1993).
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II. SPACE ADVERTISING AND THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH
DOCTRINE
Viewed from a commercial speech perspective, a challenge to a
measure like House Bill 259989 would first require consideration of
whether space advertising misled those exposed to it or concerned illegal
activity.90 Regulators, of course, have available to them the same tools for
dealing with misleading space ads that they have for controlling misleading
commercial speech that appears in any other medium.9 Space advertising,
in the absence of technological characteristics that would make it inherently
more misleading than advertising in other media, should produce no special
concerns about misleading communication. The validity of space advertis-
ing regulations will n6t turn on the first Central Hudson/Fox prong.
The second Central Hudson/Fox prong requires that the Court "ask
whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial."'  House Bill
2599 does not explicitly state a governmental interest; presumably,
however, the sponsors of such legislation will develop a legislative history
that will permit, during the litigation process, the assertion of significant
governmental interests.9' Aesthetics, and perhaps traffic safety, seem the
89. By its terms, H.R. 2599 directs the Secretary of Commerce to prohibit "advertising
in outer space, including the placement of images or objects in outer space that are visible
from earth, for purposes of marketing or otherwise promoting the sale or use of goods or
services." H.R. 2599, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1993). The Court, therefore, would
evaluate a challenge to an enacted H.R. 2599 by reference to the commercial speech
doctrine. As discussed, infra notes 121-54 and accompanying text, noncommercial messages
appearing from space through the same technology should generate objections based on the
same considerations as the objections to commercial advertising from space.
90. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 n.9
(1980).
91. The Federal Trade Commission Act, which would certainly apply to space ads,
makes unlawful, for example, the dissemination of false advertising in "commerce, by any
means" designed to directly or indirectly induce "the purchase of food, drugs, devices, or
cosmetics." 15 U.S.C. § 52(a)(1) (1988). Courts, of course, would also presumably uphold
regulations aimed at speech about illegal activity. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973).
92. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
93. Failure of the legislature to actually consider a governmental interest can prove fatal
to laws that infringe on "a protected liberty." Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S.
61, 68 (1981). The Court must assess "the substantiality of the justification offered for a
regulation that significantly impinge[s] on freedom of speech." Id. at 69; see also Adams
Outdoor Advertising of Atlanta, Inc. v. Fulton County, Ga., 738 F. Supp. 1431, 1433 (N.D.
Ga. 1990) (billboard ban held invalid where the ordinance itself gave no indication of the
governmental interest it sought to advance and where governmental agency presented no
summary judgment evidence showing that the legislative body, in passing the ordinance,
actually considered the claimed interest in aesthetics). The Central Hudson/Fox test does
not permit a reviewing court to "supplant the precise interests put forward by the state with
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most likely candidates.94 Most of the expressed opposition to plans for
space-based billboard platforms stems from aesthetic considerations.
Assertion of aesthetics as the governmental interest invites examina-
tion of aesthetics as a concept. Courts have found aesthetics an appropriate
governmental concern. For example, the Supreme Court recognized that:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values
it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as
monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the
community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as
clean, well balanced as well as carefully patrolled.95
Billboard regulations, for example, usually arise from legislative concerns
about the harm they do to the visual landscape, an effect one court termed
"obvious." 96 Courts frequently find that billboard control measures
encourage "appreciation for the visual environment." 97 An aesthetic
rationale also often underlies legislative initiatives like the National
Environmental Policy Act of 196998 and similar state statutes.99
The traditional objection to aesthetic justifications for governmental
action resides in an uneasiness about the subjectivity of such a construct.
Beauty, as everyone knows, lies in the eye of the beholder. Aesthetic
judgments "are necessarily subjective, defying objective evaluation, and for
other suppositions." Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1798 (1993).
94. Traffic safety may not offer a particularly compelling basis for banning space ads.
Safety has not always fared well as a rationale for limits on other kinds of expression
visible to the driving public. One court, for example, found highway safety an insufficient
governmental interest for banning billboards because billboard proponents presented "an
exceptionally strong array of uncontradicted recitals that billboards do not cause accidents."
John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6, 11 (lst Cir. 1980), aff'd, 453 U.S. 916
(1981). But see Bums v. Barrett, 561 A.2d 1378, 1382 (Conn.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1003
(1989) (citing numerous cases in support of its conclusion that "a governmental judgment
that highway billboards are traffic hazards is not manifestly unreasonable'). Campbell,
however, still reinforces the point that a governmental body must prove the merit in an
asserted governmental interest, particularly since some, like safety, do not easily suggest
themselves as matters of judicial notice. Campbell, 639 F.2d at 11. Congress may have real
difficulty in proving a connection between space ad platforms and accidents, especially
since it will have no statistics or other actual experience on which to draw.
95. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (citation omitted).
96. Campbell, 639 F.2d at 11.
97. National Advertising Co. v. Village of Downers Grove, 561 N.E.2d 1300, 1306 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990), cert. denied, 567 N.E.2d 333 (Ill.), and cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2917
(1991).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
99. See John J. Costonis, Law and Aesthetics: A Critique and a Reformation of the
Dilemmas, 80 MICH. L. REV. 355, 362 (1982).
Number 3]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
that reason must be carefully scrutinized to determine if they are only a
public rationalization of an impermissible purpose."' °
Subjectivity complaints, however, do not constitute the only, or
necessarily the most compelling, objection to visual beauty as a rationale
for limiting constitutionally protected freedoms. Professor Costonis, for
example, observed that poorly conceived or drafted visual beauty-based
aesthetic controls are often of dubious constitutionality because their
authors have not thoughtfully attempted to accommodate them with
substantive and procedural values like those in the First and Fourteenth
Amendments."'1 For one thing, "[s]tandards of visual beauty cannot be
'narrowly drawn"' to serve their claimed interest;102 precision about
visual beauty is seldom possible or even desirable. For another, in many
industrial and commercial areas "countless types of intrusion on the natural
landscape" already exist,'" making it difficult, without arbitrariness, to
single out some for regulation.
Despite the objections, the Court will likely find aesthetics acceptable
as a substantial governmental interest in the space advertising context.
Painting an unpleasant picture of orbiting ad platforms is not difficult. The
account of the despoiled Hawaiian vacation at the beginning of this Article
illustrates the assumption that our unhappy vacationers might return home
and implore their senators and representatives to support House Bill 2599
or something like it. "Preservation or creation of a visually beautiful
environment" has for a long time served as a social interest underpinning
aesthetic controls in the United States.'04 In Metromedia, the Supreme
Court's leading billboard regulation case, the plurality, in only two
sentences, sustained the validity of both aesthetics and safety as substantial
governmental interests. 05 Congresspersons may easily accept imperfect
vacations and other complaints as sufficient evidence of the need to elevate
such an interest above Nike's desire for another place to hawk sneakers.
Courts have so often recognized aesthetics as a legitimate governmental
concern that, whatever other problems the Supreme Court may have with
space ad regulations, it is not likely to find the claimed interest insubstan-
tial.
100. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 510 (1981) (White, J.,
plurality opinion).
101. Costonis, supra note 99, at 361.
102. Id. at 446.
103. Sherwood, supra note 45, at 298-99.
104. Costonis, supra note 99, at 357.
105. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, at 507-08 (1981).
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Prong three of the Central Hudson/Fox test asks whether the
regulation actually advances the government's claimed interest." 6 A space
ad ban certainly prevents any further distress to our disillusioned vacation-
ers; upon enactment of House Bill 2599 or a similar measure, they need
never fear another odyssey fouled by a Big Mac ad beamed from space. A
regulation that reduces the amount of speech when speech supposedly
treads on aesthetics should advance, in some way, an aesthetic interest.
House Bill 2599 and any other space ad restriction will satisfy prong
three. 1
0 7
The real balancing of governmental interests and First Amendment
interests usually occurs on prong four of the Central Hudson/Fox test. A
court must analyze under prong four how well the regulation fits with the
governmental interest and must do so in light of constitutional limits on
government incursion into free expression!0 A court must examine the
degree to which the regulation intrudes upon the First Amendment rights
of both speaker and audience. In commercial speech cases, the audience's
interest receives significant scrutiny because a large part of the rationale for
protecting commercial expression lies in consumer interests in informa-
tion.109 In evaluating the intrusion of a regulation on expression rights,
courts should also investigate the availability of alternative means of
communication.10 Commercial speech jurisprudence places greater
106. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
107. Space ad regulation will not implicate the third prong concerns discussed in
Metromedia. Insofar as commercial speech doctrine was at issue, that Court realized that
San Diego's ordinance banning some commercial signs (those off an advertiser's property)
while allowing others (those on the advertiser's property) potentially compromised the
claimed aesthetic and safety interests. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 508-12. The Metromedia
plurality ultimately rejected that argument, holding that the city could legitimately conclude
that some commercial interests, like on-site business identification, could outweigh its
aesthetic concerns without destroying the aesthetics-based rationale for banning off-site
signs. Id. at 512. Space ad regulation, however, should not invoke the Metromedia on-
site/off-site debate. The commercial/noncommercial speech concerns in Metromedia do,
however, apply in the space ad regulation context.
108. Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1798 (1993) (stating courts must decide
"whether the extent of the restriction on protected speech is in reasonable proportion to the
interests served"); Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
109. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983). There, the
regulation against mailing unsolicited contraceptive ads prevented recipients of the ads from
receiving information about the important social issues of family planning and disease
control. Id. at 74-75.
110. Compare Linmark Assoc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977)
(pointing out the inadequacy of alternatives to on-site real estate "For Sale" signs) with
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (rejecting in-person solicitation in
attorney advertising). Cases like Chralik rest on the sometimes unstated proposition that
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emphasis on the rights of listeners to receive information than of speakers
to communicate information. Nearly all of the Supreme Court's major
commercial speech decisions that protect speech do so on the basis of
advancing consumer interests in receiving information. Bigelow, Virginia
Pharmacy, Linmark, Carey, and Bates, the major precursors to Central
Hudson, emphasized the benefit that consumers receive from knowing
about things like abortion services, prescription drug prices, available real
estate, contraceptives, and legal services. In finally tying together the
Central Hudson test, the Court stressed that consumers would receive
useful information in the advertising that the state wanted to ban."' In
post-Central Hudson cases, like Bolger, the Court retained its focus on the
value of commercial speech to persons who hear or see it, holding that
"advertising for contraceptives ... implicates 'substantial individual and
societal interests' in the free-flow of commercial information.""' 2
When the Court has not found that commercial speech advances
consumer information interests, it has declined protection. Friedman, for
example, held that trade names have "no intrinsic meaning..1 .. The use
of trade names by optometrists did nothing to provide consumer informa-
tion. Whether or not optometrists used trade names had "only the most
incidental effect on the content of the commercial speech of Texas
optometrists.""1 4 In other cases rejecting protection for commercial
speech, the Court simply has not found a consumer information interest that
would override governmental interests in regulation. Even though the Court
has not cast its holdings in such terms, the lack of clearly compelling
consumer information interests has plainly permitted approval of regula-
tions.'15
attorneys can exercise their First Amendment rights and those of the consuming public
without the evil of in-person solicitation.
111. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 570-71
(1980). The utility ads actually served the state interest of energy conservation, and also
served consumers, because some ads provided information about energy efficiency.
112. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 69 (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 700-
01 (1977)).
113. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12 (1979).
114. Id. at 16.
115. See United States v. Edge Brdcst. Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2705 (1993) (validating a
federal statute forbidding radio stations in states without lotteries from running ads for
lotteries in other states); Posadas de P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 344
(1986) (upholding a ban on gambling ads directed to residents of Puerto Rico though
casinos could advertise to tourists). In neither case did the Court find a significant enough
consumer information interest that would override the second prong governmental interests.
Both courts emphasized the strength of the governmental interests. But see Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 769 (1976);
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975) (both finding superior consumer information
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An additional measure of the intrusiveness of a regulation is whether
alternative means of communication exist that permit the speaker and
audience to exercise their First Amendment rights. Despite the Court's
admonition that "[o]ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of
expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be
exercised in some other place,"'1 6 proponents of expression demonstrate
a weaker First Amendment interest if a regulation leaves other means of
communications available. 7
Space ad regulation clearly will benefit from inquiries into consumer
information interests and availability of alternative communication channels.
First, since space ad regulations will aim at a medium, not specific
messages, space ad proponents may have trouble arguing that without space
ads, consumers simply will not have information. There are, of course,
other media. Nike, Coca-Cola, IBM, and other potential purchasers of
orbiting platform advertisements do not lack other adequate venues for
conveying their messages. Similarly, persons who would benefit from
seeing messages displayed on orbiting platforms have plenty of other places
to receive them."' The Court likely will conclude, therefore, that space
ad regulations will not significantly intrude on the First Amendment
interests of speakers or consumers. The government's aesthetic interests
will outweigh the limited First Amendment interests at stake.
Posadas, Friedman, and Edge provide examples of the limits on
commercial speech that the Court will accept when proponents of speech
cannot present a strong consumer information interest for receivers of the
speech, particularly where alternative communication methods exist. Space
ad platforms will likely carry the same messages that appear on television,
in newspapers, on billboards, and countless other places. They will not
interests).
116. Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 76-77 (1981) (citing Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939)).
117. In Edge, for example, preventing a North Carolina radio station from advertising
the Virginia lottery did not keep either Virginia or North Carolina residents from receiving
information about the Virginia lottery, since, under the statute, "Virginia could advertise its
lottery through radio and television stations licensed to Virginia locations, even if their
signals reached deep into North Carolina." Edge, 113 S. Ct. at 2704.
118. Cases like Bolger do not contradict this conclusion. Since media like radio,
television, and billboards frequently decline contraceptive ads, direct mail may constitute
the most effective way to advertise such products. Consumers, therefore, have a strong
informational interest in receiving contraceptive ads in the mail and the advertiser has fewer
effective alternative means of communication than advertisers of other products. The Court
could have overturned the Bolger regulation on that basis even without recognizing, as it
did, that the statute was content-based because it applied only to mailed contraceptive ads
and, therefore, not subject to time, place, or manner analysis. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69 n.18 (1983).
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provide consumers with information that they cannot easily obtain
elsewhere. Congress, in passing a measure like House Bill 2599, will have
decided that space ads are ugly. The Court would likely conclude that the
governmental interest in stopping ugliness constitutes a substantial enough
concern to permit regulation, probably to the point of prohibition.
Theoretically, consumers in remote areas underserved by other media
might assert a strong enough First Amendment interest that the Court
would uphold only specific limits short of a ban. Such limits, for example,
might restrict space ad platforms to visibility in certain geographic areas,
limit them as to size or time of illumination, or impose other restric-
tions." 9 That the Supreme Court would likely sustain, under its commer-
cial speech doctrine, regulations banning or at least significantly restricting
space ads would not greatly upset many people. The objections to space ads
lie in an aversion to the assault on aesthetics by an offensive technology.
Space ad platforms will likely have only a small, not particularly popular
constituency-advertising agencies, large corporations, and free speech
devotees. Even the disgruntled vacationers, however, might pause at the
words of Justice Black who, in dissenting from restrictions imposed on a
then-new technology-loud speakers-forty-five years ago, warned:
The basic premise of the First Amendment is that all present instru-
ments of communication, as well as others that inventive genius may
bring into being, shall be free from governmental censorship or
prohibition. Laws which hamper the free use of some instruments of
communication thereby favor competing channels.'
IXM. NONCOMMERCIAL SPACE MESSAGES AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
As the analysis offered above indicates, the commercial speech
doctrine will not likely offer protection for space-based messages promoting
commercially available goods and services. Suppose, however, that the
same space ad company that provides Burger King with the means to
advertise "Whoppers with Cheese" from the heavens sells time and space
on an orbiting message platform to the National Abortion Rights Action
League (NARAL) for an ad that reads:
PROTECT ABORTION PROVIDERS Now!
119. Such regulations, of course, resemble time, place, and manner restrictions frequently
applied to noncommercial speech. See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989).
The Court adheres to this approach, declining the "least restrictive means possible" approach
because it would be "incompatible with the subordinate position of commercial speech in
the scale of First Amendment values to apply a more rigid standard to commercial speech
than is applied to fully protected speech." Edge, 113 S. Ct. at 2705.
120. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 102 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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The commercial speech doctrine that will probably sustain strict
regulations on Burger King's ads does not apply to NARAL's ad. That ad
contains speech about a significant political issue which receives greater
First Amendment protection than commercial speech."' Expression on
public matters rests "on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First
Amendment values"' and "is the essence of self-government."'"
While government may regulate even this kind of speech, it can usually
only do so without respect to the content of the speech and only with
narrowly tailored measures that advance a significant governmental
interest. 24 Moreover, the restriction on free expression must be no more
than is essential to further the asserted interest.'2s
The Supreme Court usually considers regulations directed at a general
mode of communication or a manner of expression to be content-neutral,
but finds regulations directed at specific messages to be content-based.
1 26
"Determining whether a particular restriction on speech actually is content-
neutral requires inquiry into the governmental purpose behind the restriction
and the nature of the message that the speaker wishes to express."'2 7
Political speech delivered through an aesthetically offensive medium
presents a difficult dilemma.12 1 The government frequently has a signifi-
121. See Edge, 113 S. Ct. at 2703.
122. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (quoting Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)).
123. Id. (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964)).
124. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115-17 (1972); United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
125. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 115-17; O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
126. Sherwood, supra note 45, at 290.
127. Id. at 291.
128. Analysis of how the Court should approach restrictions that ban or limit a medium
of communication, not just particular messages, frequently occurs in the context of whether
a regulation constitutes a content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction. In Members of
the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984), the Court noted that "the
substantive evil-visual blight-is not merely a possible byproduct of the activity, but is
created by the medium of expression itself." Id. at 810. This is surely the case with space
message platforms. The Vincent outcome, sustaining regulations barring campaign signs
from public property, turned on the textual neutrality of the ordinance, the strength of the
governmental interest in aesthetics, and the fact that the ordinance, by banning only public,
not private, signs, curtailed "no more speech than is necessary to accomplish its purpose."
Id. The Court, therefore, could conclude that it was dealing with a narrowly tailored time,
place, or manner restriction on speech that had nothing to do with content. See id. at 808.
The Vincent dissenters, however, cautioned that banning an entire medium of
communication should require that the government show whether it "has committed itself
to addressing the identified aesthetic problem." Id. at 828 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Such
vigilance would permit restrictions "only if the government demonstrates that it is pursuing
an identified objective seriously and comprehensively and in ways that are unrelated to the
restriction of speech." Id. In the space context, such a requirement would eliminate concerns
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cant interest that its restrictions legitimately seek to advance, but the means
of achieving the objective may easily obliterate the strong expressive
interests that accompany what the Supreme Court calls "core" speech about
political matters. 29
In evaluating government's power to regulate noncommercial speech
from space, courts would first look at the governmental interests asserted,
much like the second prong of the commercial speech analysis. Again, a
court must evaluate the strength of aesthetics as a governmental interest.
Again, it likely would find aesthetics a significant governmental inter-
est. 3° In a political speech case, however, courts should more vigorously
scrutinize the governmental interest in aesthetics. The potential for
diminishing core political speech rights merits a more stringent review.
Professor Costonis's reservations about aesthetics as a basis for intrusions
on First Amendment interests carry even greater force in the political
speech context. The fact that something is "ugly, in the eyes of some
members of the community" is not enough to justify limiting speech
because a "state ban on expression solely on the basis of its offensiveness
is censorship pure and simple."''
Practical judicial review problems also attach to aesthetic rationales.
As Justice Brennan once pointed out, "the inherent subjectivity of aesthetic
judgments makes it all too easy for the government to fashion its
justification for a law in a manner that impairs the ability of a reviewing
court meaningfully to make the required inquiries."' A court should, for
example, require the government to show how space message platforms will
harm the visual landscape in comparison with other permitted forms of
expression, thereby testing the government's real commitment to aesthetics.
Given the Supreme Court's frequently stated view that it accords political
speech greater protection than commercial speech,' it should more
carefully and critically examine the asserted governmental interest when a
regulatory scheme would limit political speech.
about arbitrariness that result from singling out the space message medium when other
permitted media do as much or more aesthetic harm.
129. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989).
130. See supra notes 89-105 and accompanying text.
131. Costonis, supra note 99, at 378.
132. Vincent, 466 U.S. at 822 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Edge Brdcst. Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2703 (1993); Fox, 492
U.S. at 477. Justice Blackmun recently criticized the lesser protection offered commercial
speech, writing that "there is no reason to treat truthful commercial speech as a class that
is less 'valuable' than noncommercial speech." City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,
Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1518 (1993) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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Assuming, however, that the Court sustains aesthetics as a valid
governmental interest, it still must scrutinize whatever regulations the
government imposes in light of the harm they would do to First Amend-
ment interests. Several considerations counsel against sustaining a ban like
House Bill 2599 or broad-based limits that significantly restrict political
speech from space. These considerations recognize the difficulty in meeting
the "narrowly drawn" requirement in the Court's. noncommercial speech
jurisprudence. 134
Banning or severely restricting space-based political speech represents
an exercise in arbitrary line drawing. If the principal objection to space
message platforms resides in their "ugliness," why are they uglier or more
offensive than: on-site or off-site billboards; "creative" commercial
architecture; 135 airplanes towing banners promoting weekend flea markets;
or water towers adorned with commercial messages (Buy Pepsi!),
noncommercial, but non-political messages (Go Hornets!), or political
messages (Invade Haiti Now!)? Objective evidence that these messages
constitute a greater harm simply does not exist.
The drive to bar speech in the name of combating ugliness does have
limits. Governmental efforts to ban political signs placed in the yard of the
sign-owner's home partially on the ground that such signs "create ugliness,
visual blight and clutter, [and] tarnish the natural beauty of the landscape"
have been rejected by the Court. 36 Though the First Amendment "does
not guarantee the right to communicate one's views at all times and places
or in any manner that may be desired," 137 taking away any one place, but
not others, based on a legislative determination of the relative ugliness of
them, makes a mockery of the "narrowly drawn" requirement. That can
occur only by elevating aesthetics above speech as a societal value.'38
134. Costonis, supra note 99, at 446.
135. See Sherwood, supra note 45, at 298-99.
136. City of Ladue v. Gilles, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2041 (1994).
137. Heffron v. International So'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981).
138. The Court may consider the "captive audience" dilemma as another element of the
state's aesthetics-based interest in regulating speech. A captive audience situation exists
when listeners or viewers cannot escape expression. Government, for example, has a
"substantial interest in protecting its citizens from unwelcome noise." Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989); see also City of Beaufort v. Baker, 432 S.E.2d 470, 473
(S.C. 1993) (upholding an ordinance banning street preachers partly because area merchants
"are captive audience in their businesses, unable to transact business or escape from
excessive noise"); Eanes v. State, 569 A.2d 604, 611-13 (Md. 1990) (relying on the
"unwilling listener" concept in Kovacs v. Cooper, 366 U.S. 77, 86-87 (1949), to uphold
conviction of anti-abortion protester who disturbed apartment dwellers and businesspeople
with loud, unamplifled preaching).
Space-delivered messages are potentially susceptible to the captive audience complaint
because of their widespread visibility at certain times and in certain places. Regulating
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Relatedly, as David Sherwood pointed out in discussing commercial
architecture and the First Amendment, modem society includes many
"intrusions on the natural landscape" already, particularly in industrial and
commercial areas.'39 Singling out space message platforms may do little
to promote aesthetics anyway. In urban areas, for example, adding space
message platforms may do no more harm than the presently permissible
illuminated Goodyear Blimp. In deciding that a city could not ban
"commercial" newsracks while permitting newspaper newsracks to remain
in place, the Supreme Court noted that "all newsracks, regardless of
whether they contain commercial or noncommercial publications, are
equally at fault" as to the aesthetic damage they do."4 The same principle
applies when the aesthetic damage done by other "intrusive" messages is
compared to space message platforms. All are at fault.
The availability of alternative communication channels arguably
validates the governmental interest in regulating even core speech delivered
through an ugly medium like orbiting message platforms. The Court used
that principle in sustaining a city ordinance that prohibited placing political
campaign signs on utility poles and other public property.' 4' Justice
Stevens wrote:
The Los Angeles Ordinance does not affect any individual's freedom
to exercise the right to speak and to distribute literature in the same
place where the posting of signs on public property is prohibited. To
the extent that the posting of signs on public property has advantages
over these forms of expression, there is no reason to believe that these
same advantages cannot be obtained through other means. To the
contrary, the findings of the District Court indicate that there are ample
alternative modes of communication in Los Angeles.'42
All communication media, however, are not created equal. Unpopular
speakers generally have difficulty gaining access to large numbers of
listeners and viewers, making denial of any medium to them more offensive
to free speech values. 43 Economic considerations sometimes make allegedly
"alternative" communication methods no alternative at all.' As noted in
the holding of the Linmark case, newspaper ads seldom substitute well for
on-location real estate "For Sale" signs, since such "alternatives" frequently
"involve more cost and less autonomy."1 45 Presently, no one can say that
aspects of their operations, though not banning them, could potentially cure this concern.
139. See Sherwood, supra note 45, at 298-99.
140. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1515 (1993).
141. Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
142. Id. at 812 (citation omitted).
143. See id. at 820 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
144. Id.
145. Linmark Assoc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977).
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space message platforms will not become the most effective, efficient
method for political speakers to communicate about war and peace,
abortion, tax cuts or increases, campaigns for office, and a host of other
public topics. In such an event, a good argument can be made that the First
Amendment should not tolerate excessive intrusion on access to a
medium. 46 The Court's admonition that the First Amendment should
protect all methods of communication to avoid favoring any one method,
rings even truer when the regulated speech concerns core political
issues.1 4 The price of banning or excessively limiting an entire medium
of communication is high, requiring "the government to provide tangible
proof of the legitimacy and substantiality of its aesthetic objective.""14
Courts may, of course, treat regulations on space-delivered political
messages as time, place, or manner restrictions on expression.1 49 Such
restrictions "must be narrowly tailored to serve the government's legitimate,
content-neutral interests but [they] need not be the least restrictive or least
intrusive means" of regulation. 5 ° The Supreme Court clearly established
that time, place, and manner restrictions on core speech need only
incorporate means "not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the
government's interest."15' The Court, therefore, could view limits on
political messages delivered from space as simply curbs on the manner of
expression.15
Whether the regulations were broader than necessary to achieve the
government's objective would depend on the exact scope of the regulations.
An outright ban might survive scrutiny for the same reason the Vincent ban
did-availability of alternative methods of communication. As demonstrat-
ed in the commercial speech analysis, space messengers will have
alternative communication methods available. Political speakers will face
the same argument as the commercial advertisers-there are plenty of other
places to say the same thing. Less comprehensive limits, like restrictions
on size, illumination, and time of visibility, remain subject to the alternative
communication analysis. But, they may constitute the outer limit of
146. The Court has, at times, been quite concerned about the cost consequences of
banning or limiting a particular medium of communication as Linmark forcefully
demonstrates. At other times, it has exhibited much less solicitude for the problem. See
Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812 n.30.
147. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 102 (1949).
148. Vincent, 466 U.S. at 828 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
149. See id. at 808.
150. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989).
151. Id. at 800.
152. See Vincent, 466 U.S. at 810 ("With respect to signs... it is the tangible medium
of expressing the message that has the adverse impact on the appearance of the landscape.").
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regulation only if speech proponents can demonstrate a lack of effective
alternatives for reasons of geography or cost. Given the Court's current free
speech jurisprudence, regulators can justify strict limits on even non-
commercial political messages delivered from space. The Court likely will
accept the substantiality of the aesthetic interest and conclude that no First
Amendment interest outweighs it.1
53
The Supreme Court will likely sustain significant regulations on both
commercial and noncommercial messages delivered from space. The Court
actually treats commercial and noncommercial speech very much alike
when the regulation at issue can be sustained on a content-neutral basis.
This similar treatment of content-neutral regulations, a balancing test
applied in both the commercial and noncommercial contexts, measures
governmental interests against First Amendment interests. The space
message issue illustrates how this approach can denigrate First Amendment
values at the expense of values, like aesthetics, that arguably have a weaker
constitutional underpinning.'54
153. Vincent almost certainly compels this result. Discovery Network and Metromedia,
which hinge on reservations about different treatment for different kinds of speech, support
it. Discovery Network condemned different treatment of so-called commercial and other
newsracks, emphasizing that Cincinnati had not shown that one did more harm than the
other, and the Court was not willing to make the distinction based solely on assigning
greater "value" to noncommercial newsracks. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,
Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1515-16 (1993). Metromedia refused to allow favoritism for certain
kinds of noncommercial speech over others. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453
U.S. 490, 514-15 (1981). A ban like H.R. 2599 will not discriminate between types of
space-delivered messages; neither it nor a lesser restriction that applies to all space-delivered
messages would offend Discovery Network or Metromedia. Gilles, though generally
protective of expression rights, does not compel a different result. Nothing about space
advertising, even of political messages, compares to the interest that citizens have in
displaying messages from their homes as a means of providing information about
themselves and their own identities. See City of Ladue v. Gilles, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2046
(1994). The difficulty with this analysis lies in its insistence on so narrowly viewing space-
delivered messages as a discrete manner of communication. Viewed simply as part of the
overall message environment, what Justice Stevens said about commercial and noncommer-
cial newsracks in Discovery Network applies to space-delivered ads and ads glittering on
the Goodyear blimp-one is "no greater an eyesore" than the other. Discovery Network, 113
S. Ct. at 1514.
154. Aesthetics, unlike free speech, springs from no explicit constitutional foundation,
though the "general Welfare" responsibility entrusted to Congress in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 1, undoubtedly encompasses it.
[Vol. 47
ADVERTISING FROM OUTER SPACE
CONCLUSIONS
A. Tomlinson: Ban Without Reservation
Upholding the constitutionality of a federal law totally banning space
billboards would be the proper course regardless of whether the expression
contained on the medium of expression was purely commercial or purely
political. Without doubt, this medium of expression is entirely novel and
truly revolutionary. Space billboards, in fact, may be a little difficult to
actually envision-not that one or more of them cannot be seen in the
mind's eye, but coming to grips with the idea that they could always be
there is not easy. At the least, they would create a captive audience, they
would greatly change the world, and they would interfere with nature in a
truly profound way.
The unique magnitude of this medium of expression deserves
recognition and consideration. First, the medium could be literally
ubiquitous, assuming enough examples were orbiting the earth so that at
least one of them would be visible from any spot on the earth at any time.
Second, the medium would be unavoidable. A vacationer might be able to
"see the Pyramids along the Nile" without seeing a space billboard, but she
could not "watch a sunrise from a tropic isle" without seeing one or more.
Third, the medium would be omnipresent, having the capability of being
visible all day, all night, forever. Fourth, the medium could fill the sky,
there being no technological limit on how many space billboards could be
in orbit at any one time other than the physical limitations of space itself.
Constitutionally permissible time, place, and manner restrictions
provide all the justification needed to ban this medium of expression, the
situation fitting neatly into the four-part test. First, banning the entire
medium of expression would be content-neutral. Second, the ban would
serve the governmental interest of preventing millions of people in this
country from being a perpetual captive audience, 5' and it would prevent
the despoiling of the aesthetically-pleasing (to most everyone) open
sky,156 both of which are easily demonstrable interests. Third, there are
many alternative media of expression for any messages that might be
placed on a space billboard. It seems clear that no other medium of
expression is nearly as ubiquitous or involves nearly such magnitude. The
155. See Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); see also Erznoznik v.
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) ("Captivity" occurs where "the degree of captivity
makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer... to avoid exposure.').
156. See Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
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requirement of alternative means of expression, however, does not mandate
an exactly comparable alternative. Fourth, there would be no problem with
narrowly tailoring the law so that it prohibited only advertising from outer
space by orbiting billboards, thereby doing no greater harm to First
Amendment values than absolutely necessary to achieve the desired end.
This Article's Coauthor has written that even the unhappy Maui
vacationers might pause at the Justice Black missive concerning new media
of expression. Justice Black, one of only two First Amendment absolutists
ever to serve on the Court, once wrote in a spirited dissent in a case
involving loudspeakers that the First Amendment surely protected future
media of expression as well as existing ones.157 In theory, Justice Black's
idea sounds great, but in practice may have spoken too loud.
Space billboards as a medium of expression are no more analogous
to loudspeakers than they are to any other present medium. Loudspeakers,
for example, have never had the potential to be literally ubiquitous,
unavoidable, and omnipresent from any spot on earth. An analogy outside
expression may be the development of nuclear weapons. Surely Justice
Black would not have argued that no new military weapon should deserve
more scrutiny by society than any of its predecessors just because it is new.
Atomic weapons were not just bigger bombs. They were in a class all by
themselves. Everything changed. Military and national security paradigms
had to be re-thought. The order of magnitude of space billboards is, in
context, comparable.
This Article's Coauthor is nervous, understandably, about denying
abortion-rights advocates (or their opposites, no doubt) the opportunity to
promulgate their message from a space billboard. Again, bearing in mind
the unique magnitude of space billboards and fully realizing the paramount
need not to regulate expression on the basis of its content, one could be at
least equally nervous about the lack of a First Amendment exception which
would allow a ban on space billboards. Just as one space billboard could
proclaim that abortion providers should be protected, another space
billboard could proclaim:
HOLOCAUST:
JUST A JEWISH LIE!
or
RACIST WHITES
WILL SOON DIE!
or
157. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 102 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting).
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AFRICANS ARE
GENETICALLY INFERIOR!
It may be fortunate that time, place, and manner restrictions allow what
content-based restrictions do not.
All of this discussion will be moot should space billboards become a
reality from abroad. For this problem to be solved, the solution must be
worldwide to be effective. That means a treaty. The organization which
may be the most likely starting place is the United Nations; more
specifically, the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space. This committee is interested in such matters as land remote-sensing,
nuclear power sources in outer space, space transportation systems,
planetary exploration, astronomy, space debris, the geostationary orbit,'
and communications and image and data interpretation. 59 With such an
agenda already in place, adding space advertising to the list would seem
appropriate.
Law-for whatever reason, and there are many-always lags behind
technological development."6 Given the global nature and high degree of
importance of the issue of space advertising, lawmakers-indeed,
international lawmakers-need to anticipate the best response to the issue
before launch and deployment renders lawmaking an expostfacto exercise
in futility.161
158. Support Asked for Regional Education Centres, UN CHRON., June 1993, at 69, 69.
159. Environmental Monitoring, UNISPACE HI Discussed, UN CHRON., Sept. 1993, at
53, 53.
160. The law has rested on a perception of technology that is sometimes accurate, often
inaccurate, and which changes slowly as technology changes fast. ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL,
TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 7 (1983).
161.
Complex technology, far beyond lay competence to evaluate, is having
enormous impact on society. This effect has increased so quickly that our
traditional legal procedures and institutions are simply unable to keep pace in
shaping our use of that technology .... Society has not yet learned how to control
science and technology in a manner that maximizes benefit and minimizes harm.
Society must catch up with science.
[Technological] [d]evelopments ... today arrive so fast and [oftentimes]
provide such obvious and enticing immediate benefits, that they are brought into
wide use long before we realize that management of and limitations on that use
may be essential. When society finally does appreciate what has happened, the
systems are already in place and important options are lost forever.
• [T]he law and technology specialty entails two major functions. The first
is "technology assessment." This is the task of identifying societal impact
concerns soon enough that appropriate remedial actions may be taken before
irreversibility sets in. The second function is the far more difficult task of
analyzing and modifying our legal practices and institutions in a manner that deals
satisfactorily with the concerns thus uncovered.
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B. Wiley: Regulate with Reservations
In endorsing more limited restraints on space-delivered messages, this
Author offers two major lines of argument. First, fidelity to the literal and
"spiritual" command of the First Amendment requires some leeway for
delivering messages from space in the contemporary message environment.
Space message speakers and consumers have strong First Amendment
interests that merit protection. Second, reasonable regulations that
accommodate interests in both expression and aesthetics will meet most of
the objections to space advertising, including those lodged by my Coauthor.
Such limited regulations will not satisfy purists on either side of the debate;
they will, however, accommodate those who care about both aesthetics and
speech.
My Coauthor's analysis, taken as a whole, rests largely on the
premise that neither speakers nor consumers of speech have a sufficient
First Amendment interest in space-delivered messages to overcome
aesthetic interests. The argument, while facially appealing, does not compel
the complete space ad ban that my Coauthor seeks. Would-be space
advertisers and consumers do have a protectable First Amendment
interest-the interest in a truly vibrant, diverse marketplace of ideas:
It is the variety of the real marketplace that gives it its excitement and
color and life and quality. It is all the different fruits and vegetables
and fish and foul [sic] piled up on iced carts in the farmers' markets
of the plazas of the world's cities, all the different stocks traded on the
stock exchanges, all the different compact disks and cassette tapes
stacked in the giant record store, all the different books and magazines
crowded into a great bookstore, and yes, all the microwave ovens,
lawn mowers, athletic shoes, soft drink cans, sweatshirts, and bicycles
hung and heaped willy-nilly in the Wal-Mart, that compose all of these
individual markets, and the mass market that holds them all.'62
Though Professor Smolla referred more to kinds of messages than
types of media, his observations apply in considering any limit on First
Amendment freedoms. We depend, after all, upon the "marketplace of ideas
to distinguish that which is useful or beautiful from that which is ugly or
worthless. ' 163 Taking a medium out of the market opens the possibility
of making messages more difficult to deliver to the market where citizens,
not government, can decide their utility. Consumers and speakers need
Milton R. Wessel, What is "Law, Science and Technology" Anyway? 29 JURIMETRCS J.
259, 260-61 (1989).
162. Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case for
Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 777, 785 (1993).
163. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 321 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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access to media to make sure that the marketplace remains vibrant, even if
not always attractive.
Economics provides a related, potential First Amendment interest in
space advertising for speakers and message consumers. "The ability of a
speaker to use resources to disseminate speech links the marketplace of
ideas with the economic marketplace."'" Clearly, the greater a speaker's
wealth, the greater the speaker's ability to disseminate his or her ideas.'65
The Vincent dissenters explained how limits on a medium of communica-
tion may limit the ability of some to deliver messages efficiently, thereby
giving advantages to persons who can afford other so-called alternative
media that are burdened with less government regulation or none at all.
In deciding this First Amendment question, the critical importance of
the posting of signs as a means of communication must not be
overlooked. Use of this medium of communication is particularly
valuable in part because it entails a relatively small expense in
reaching a wide audience, allows flexibility in accommodating various
formats, typographies, and graphics, and conveys its message in a
manner that is easily read and understood by its reader or viewer.
There may be alternative channels of communication, but the preva-
lence of a large number of signs in Los Angeles is a strong indication
that, for many speakers, those alternatives are far less satisfactory.'66
No one knows exactly how much space ads will cost initially or, more
importantly, at some time in the future. They may become quite cost
effective in terms of delivering a message to a large audience at reasonable
cost. If that occurs, banning the medium could have significant content
repercussions by making it more difficult for underfunded speakers to gain
meaningful access to the marketplace. If a space ad that reaches 100
million people costs $10,000, telling the speaker to reach the same audience
with a thirty second television spot for $100,000 does not vindicate the
marketplace interest of speaker or audience.167
Finally, the "no law 1 68 command of the First Amendment permits
a restriction on speech only if government really has a serious interest that
overrules the command. 69 That should mean that government really is
pursuing its stated "objective seriously and comprehensively and in ways
164. Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information
Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1062, 1070 (1994).
165. Id.
166. Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 819 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
167. See Note, supra note 164, at 1071 (noting that restrictions on the speech of some
can enhance the speech of others).
168. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
169. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
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that are unrelated to the restriction of speech."17 If government plans to
use aesthetics as a reason for limiting free speech rights, does it really have
a coordinated, consistent plan promoting aesthetics? Or is it singling out a
particular communication medium that segments of the community do not
like, while permitting other aesthetically unpleasant media to go unchal-
lenged?
As Professor Smolla points out, "our society protects a great deal [of
speech] that has little or no plausible social value in the eyes of many."'171
In other words, since we protect all kinds of speech, much of it in ugly
media, why not this? The Goodyear Blimp sails overhead, airplanes fly by
trailing banners, and searchlights scan the sky, all comfortably within the
protective envelope of the First Amendment. In the absence of a compre-
hensive plan that takes aesthetics into consideration in the entire modem
message environment, who can say that space-delivered messages are
"more" offensive and, therefore, subject to elimination while others remain
protected?
My Coauthor resorts to the tactic of trotting out a parade of horribles
that will result from not banning ad delivery systems. Little need be said
about most of his complaints except that regulation of aspects of the space
ad industry will satisfy his concerns. These regulations could include:
limiting the number of platforms, regulating their size and shape, limiting
the use of illumination, dictating orbital paths, limiting hours of visibility,
and perhaps regulating other aspects of their operation. Congress certainly
has the power to keep them from becoming "ubiquitous" as my Coauthor
fears. Such limits would also solve his "captive audience" problem.
The space ad issue does not have to become a zero sum game in
which only promoters of aesthetics win by banning the medium, while free
speech advocates lose a potentially valuable medium of expression. The
time, place, and manner concept, if applied broadly in the context of the
entire modem message environment, rather than narrowly to only the space
message medium, provides a satisfactory analytical framework for
accommodating the needs of both sides of the divide. Rather than viewing
elimination of space ads as a manner (or place) restriction on a medium of
speech, the Court should approve only limits on the operation of space
message systems, mindful of the fact that other intrusive and offensive
media have long received First Amendment protection. The Court can
protect the public from the excesses of a medium like space message
systems while letting some of us look at them some places, sometimes, and
170. Vincent, 466 U.S. at 828 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
171. Smolla, supra note 162, at 793.
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under certain circumstances. Doing so does no more than recognize that,
"[i]n public, speakers' rights generally prevail" and "viewers and listeners
are expected to protect their own privacy."'1
172. See Note, supra note 164, at 1077.
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